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In December 2001, the Institute of Policy Studies and
Business New Zealand co-hosted a one day symposium
entitled ‘Changing Gear: Delivering the Social
Dividend’. It was addressed and attended by members
of academia, the public sector and the business sector.
This IPS Policy Paper brings together a number of the
presentations to that symposium. It includes papers
delivered by Arthur Grimes, Colin Campbell-Hunt and
Ross Wilson, plus a summary of key points raised in
the address by Glenn Withers, and some concluding
remarks by Rod Oram.
Arthur Grimes is Principal, GT Research and
Consulting, and Senior Research Associate of Motu
Economic and Public Policy Research Trust. He teaches
Money and Finance at Victoria University of Wellington
and was formerly IPS Director.
Colin Campbell-Hunt is Professor of Management at
Otago University and was formerly Associate Professor
of Management at Victoria University of Wellington.
He is a member of the Competitive Advantage New
Zealand research team.
Ross Wilson is President of the New Zealand Council
of Trade Unions.
Glenn Withers is the head of Public Policy at
Australian National University. He has been an adviser
to both the Liberal and Labor governments in Australia
and is a former Director of the Economic Planning
Advisory Commission.
Rod Oram is a leading New Zealand business and
economic journalist. Prior to coming to New Zealand
he worked as a business and economic journalist for
major UK papers.
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A massive 93 percent of the sample wants an
increase in spending on health services, with 58
percent in the “greatly increase” choice.
The picture is much the same for the
education system, 90 percent seek increased
spending, and more than half of that is for the
spending to “greatly increase”. These results
would seem to be about as close as one gets to
a universal desire.
Social Expenditures and the Economy
The opening quotation reports results from the 1998
survey of the New Zealand Study of Values (Perry and
Webster, 1999, p 78). In the questions referred to, 1,201
respondents were asked: “Suppose you had to make a
choice between ‘increasing government spending in
particular areas even though this would mean paying
higher taxes for this extra spending, or cutting
government spending in these areas and thereby
reducing taxes’; which would you choose?”. In each
area, respondents could answer one of: greatly increase,
some increase, keep the same, cut, greatly cut, or can’t
choose. Overwhelming support was registered for
increased government spending on health and education.
Strong support for increased government spending
(with increased taxes) was also indicated for the fields of
job training and assistance for the unemployed, pensions
and protecting the environment. Only 0.6% of
respondents voted for lower health expenditures (and
lower taxes), 1.0% for lower government spending on
education, and only 2-3% for cuts in spending on each of
job training, pensions and the environment. Given the
dominance of these areas in fiscal expenditures, a clear
mandate is indicated simultaneously to increase social
expenditures and taxation.
These indications are in keeping with the same
survey’s findings regarding New Zealanders’ perceptions
of the responsibilities of central government. Large
majorities consider it a central government respons-
ibility to “provide a job for everyone that wants one”,
“provide a decent standard of living for the old”, “provide
decent housing for those who can’t afford it”, “reduce
income differences between the rich and the poor”, and
“to impose strict laws to make industry do less damage
to the environment”.
These findings are also consistent with the strong
view expressed in the survey that there should be “tighter
government regulation of big companies and
multinationals”. In turn, this view is consistent with the
70% of respondents who considered “that this country is
run by a few big interests looking out for themselves”
and with the 59% of people who consider that “the
government is doing too little to help people in need”.
What can we make of these views, especially the
“near universal desire” to increase government
expenditures on health and education? Concentrating
specifically on health, international comparisons suggest
that the view expressed on this matter in the Values
Survey is quite understandable. Relative to other
developed countries, New Zealand’s real expenditure on
health services per person is low.
An international comparison of real per capita
health expenditures across the 29 OECD countries
places New Zealand at 19th place in 1998 (Ministry of
Health, 2000).1 Apart from Ireland (which spends
almost as much as New Zealand on health per capita),
all the countries which spend less on health than New
Zealand are those that would traditionally be regarded
as middle income (rather than developed) economies.
Compared with Canada and Australia (two small
developed countries with similar histories to New
Zealand and with substantially commodity-based
economies), New Zealand’s expenditures are very
low. New Zealand spent $US1,440 per person on
health compared with $US2,040 in Australia and
$US2,250 in Canada. New Zealand’s per capita
expenditures were just one-third of those in the
United States.
These figures include public plus private health
expenditures. But even if we include just public
expenditures, New Zealand still places only 19th in
the OECD.
Growing a Healthy Society
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If we analyse health expenditures as a percentage of
GDP, New Zealand shifts up the rankings. As a ratio of
GDP, we are 12th ranked on the basis of total health
expenditures (at 8.1% of GDP) and 13th ranked by
publicly funded health expenditures (at 6.2% of GDP).
Further, we are only 0.5% of GDP below the 6th ranked
country in terms of publicly funded health expenditures.
It is not a coincidence that New Zealand is 19th in
the per capita health expenditure stakes. We happen to
be 20th ranked in the OECD by GDP per capita. Figure
1 (see p 16) graphs the relationship between total health
expenditure and GDP in the OECD in 1998. The
relationship is extraordinarily close. Indeed, 94% of the
OECD cross-country variation in publicly funded per
capita health expenditure (and 93% of the cross-country
variation in total health expenditure) can be explained as
a function solely of countries’ per capita GDP.2
The statistical regression estimates (reported in
endnote 2, see p 17) indicate that as countries become
wealthier, they not only spend more on health (both
publicly funded and in total), but the rate of extra health
spending also increases. Each 1% of extra real GDP per
capita on average increases total per capita health
expenditure by 1.44%, and increases publicly funded
health expenditure by 1.51% per capita.
Norway is now the third richest OECD country per
capita, a spot once occupied by New Zealand. It spends
an almost identical share of GDP on publicly funded
health as does New Zealand (both at 6.2% of GDP). It
spends almost as much as we do on total health care
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. If New Zealand had
held onto third spot in the income rankings (i.e. with
Norway’s current per capita GDP) and spent the same on
healthcare as a percent of GDP as does Norway, we
would now have real health care expenditures 45%
above our current levels.
The evidence is abundantly clear. The only way to
increase health expenditure substantially in New Zealand
(whether publicly funded or in total) is to increase our
per capita GDP. Similar results can be expected for other
expenditure items such as publicly funded education.
Thus those who wish to see greater social expenditures
(whether in health, education, income support,
environmental and conservation policies, police and/or
defence) must realistically expend their primary energies
in lifting the level of New Zealand’s national income.
Quite simply, New Zealand must grow faster.
New Zealand’s Growth Record
Contrary to some impressions, New Zealand and New
Zealanders are on average now significantly richer
than they were in the 1950s. In a recent OECD
publication, Angus Maddison (2001) documents
the annual GDP, population and GDP per capita of
124 countries for the period 1950 to 1998. Other key
statistics are also included (such as exports and, in
some cases, migration flows).3 Again, the GDP
statistics are presented in purchasing power parity
terms, so that the figures are adjusted to take account
of changing living costs over time and different living
costs across countries at each point in time. A country
that has relatively low living costs (such as New
Zealand) will have higher relative GDP in an
international context on the basis of this measure
than it  will using conventional international
comparisons.
Maddison’s figures document that New Zealand’s
population rose from 1,909,000 in 1950 to reach
3,811,000 in 1998. On a PPP basis,4 New Zealand’s
GDP grew from $16,136 million in 1950 to $56,322
million in 1998. Thus, by 1998, GDP was 3.5 times its
1950 level and GDP per capita was 75% above its
1950 level. Recalling that 1950 was a time of buoyant
commodity prices (especially for wool), and that New
Zealand was then the third richest developed country
in the world (after the United States and Switzerland),
the substantial rise in living standards appears to belie
the pessimism often expressed in this country. This
increase in income has enabled health and education
expenditures to rise very substantially on a real per
capita basis over the past 50 years.
If we only looked backwards or if other countries
had not also grown substantially, the national mood
might be one of celebrating our successes. However,
that is not the case: other countries’ living standards
have grown substantially faster than have New
Zealand’s – both in absolute and in per capita terms.
New Zealand is now a relatively poor developed
country. Table 1 (see over) documents per capita
living standards in New Zealand and in a number
of other developed countries in both 1950 and
1998. From once being third richest in the world,
New Zealand has slipped to twentieth. In absolute
terms, we are considerably richer than we ever have
been, but relatively we are considerably poorer.
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Table 1: GDP Per Capita (PPP Basis, 1990 $s)
Selected Developed Countries
1950 1998
Austria 3,706 18,905
Belgium 5,462 19,442
Denmark 6,946 22,123
Finland 4,253 18,324
France 5,270 19,558
Germany 3,881 17,799
Italy 3,502 17,759
Netherlands 5,996 20,224
Norway 5,463 23,660
Sweden 6,738 18,685
Switzerland 9,064 21,367
United Kingdom 6,907 18,714
Australia 7,493 20,390
New Zealand 8,453 14,779
Canada 7,437 20,559
United States 9,561 27,331
Greece 1,915 11,268
Ireland 3,446 18,183
Portugal 2,069 12,929
Spain 2,397 14,227
Source: Maddison, 2001.
Figure 2 (see p 16) compares the trajectory of New
Zealand’s per capita income relative to those of Australia
and Canada, two other small, developed and
predominantly commodity producing countries. Having
been richer than each of these countries in the early
1950s, New Zealand’s per capita living standard is now
just 72% of that in these two comparators. On average,
New Zealanders’ material living standards are only 79%
of average living standards in the UK and just 54% of the
material living standards in the USA.
Another way of considering these figures is to note
that if New Zealand’s relative living standards had
slipped since 1950, but only to the levels of those of
Australia and Canada, and if our public sector health and
education expenditures had been maintained at current
percentages of GDP, we would now be spending 28%
more in real terms on each of these important social areas
than we are now. Even if the additional growth had been
‘bought’ at the expense of a 10% reduction in the social
budget in comparison with the size of the economy, we
would still be able to spend almost 20% more on health
and education in real terms than we do now.
New Zealanders, while wanting more social
expenditures, also consider that support for economic
growth is a primary responsibility of government. The
1998 Values Survey found 91% of people supporting
the proposition that “providing industry with the help
it needs to grow” is a responsibility for central
government. Indeed, 69% of respondents considered
that priority should be given to the country achieving
a “high level of economic growth” over three other
choices presented to them.5
Further, 71% of people responded positively to the
proposition, “Competition is good. It stimulates people
to work hard to develop new ideas”. Similarly, when
asked whether “incomes should be made more equal
or whether we need larger income differences as
incentives”, more people opted for greater incentives
than greater equality.
Thus the picture of New Zealanders’ perceptions is
a confused one. People consider that priority should be
given to achieving economic growth, support greater
economic incentives and are in favour of competition.
Government should do more to assist industry achieve
growth. However, over 90% of people also support
government imposing “strict laws to make industry do
less damage to the environment”. Huge majorities
consider that government should increase expenditures
on health, education, housing, pensions, job training, the
unemployed, reducing income disparities and protecting
the environment. In order for the government to achieve
these aims, people are overwhelmingly in favour of
higher taxes.
These confusions6 may be a primary reason why
New Zealand’s growth record is so poor. Governments
must meet the overwhelming social wishes of the
populace which are at odds with achieving the economic
growth aims. The latter (because they are longer term)
are relegated to the realm of lip-service. The key, if we
wish to raise both growth and social expenditures, is to
look for the factors which produce economic growth and
to ascertain how New Zealand can maximise the
contribution of these factors.
Raising the Growth Rate
Economic growth – and hence increased living standards
– occurs when people within a country increase the
resources (especially labour and capital) available for
production and/or when they use their resources more
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effectively. This simple observation indicates a number
of avenues that we must look at in order to raise our
living standards to the levels of those countries to which
we aspire and to which we once belonged. Potential
avenues (each of which is analysed in more detail
below) include:
• increasing the labour force through a more pro-
active immigration policy;
• increasing savings in order to increase domestic
investment;
• encouraging and/or maintaining the spirit of
entrepreneurship in New Zealand;
• adopting a taxation system that encourages wealth
creation;
• becoming an integral part of a larger economy, so
enlarging the market for New Zealand products.
The first two avenues seek to increase the resources
within the economy. The last three seek to increase the
productivity of the economy’s resources.
Migration
Between 1950 and 1998, New Zealand’s population
grew at an average annual compound rate of 1.45%. By
contrast, Canada’s population grew at an annual rate of
1.66% and Australia’s grew at 1.74%. The differences
between these nations’ population growth rates was
particularly apparent over the 1973-1990 period. New
Zealand’s annual population growth rate fell to just
0.76%, compared with the 1.21% and 1.39% of Canada
and Australia respectively.
A key contributor to New Zealand’s low population
growth rate has been the net migration outflow of New
Zealand citizens, only partially compensated for by
immigration of non-New Zealand citizens. In a recent
paper, ANU’s Bob Gregory (2001) documents that since
1963, there has been net outward migration of New
Zealand citizens in every year, accounting for a total of
598,000 people. This figure is approximately equivalent
to the combined populations of Auckland and Dunedin
in 1963, or equivalent to the current combined populations
of Wellington and Christchurch.
Maddison’s figures show that between 1974 and
1998 New Zealand’s annual migration inflow amounted
to just 0.12% of its 1974 population, compared with
ratios of 0.48% and 0.64% for Canada and Australia.
Even over the 1950-1973 period, New Zealand’s annual
migration flow (of 0.54% of its 1950 population) was
below that of Canada and only half that of Australia.
The effect of migration on living standards is multi-
faceted (see Poot et al, 1988, showing that the effects
work in both directions). Migration opens up
opportunities to introduce new skills to the economy,
opens up new trade opportunities through deepening
or broadening trade networks, and increases demand
for housing and other domestic infrastructure while at
the same time potentially increasing some aspects of
social costs.
The latter aspect has often deterred government from
“opening the floodgates further”. However, Buckingham
(2000) shows that it would be cost-effective for New
Zealand to open up immigration to “elderly foreigners”
under some circumstances. While social costs would
rise, so would taxation receipts (especially GST) through
the enlarged market for New Zealand goods. Effectively,
New Zealand businesses (involved in both tradeables
and non-tradeables) would enlarge their market by
bringing the market to them.
The issue of immigration raises the question of
whether New Zealand has a large enough population to
reap economies of scale which may require a certain
critical mass of people to achieve. These effects may
stem both from the demand side of the economy
(increased demand for housing, etc.) and from the supply
side as the increased labour force is used more
productively, especially in the larger cities. The studies
of Poot et al and of Buckingham are both suggestive that
there may be scale economies achieved by further
enlarging our population through migration. In an
international context, a number of recent studies suggest
that such scale economies exist; in other words, there is
a positive relationship between population size and
economic growth (Diamond, 1999; Frankel and Romer,
1999; Frankel and Rose, 2000; Kremer, 1993).
Recent work by David Skilling (2001) and others
within Treasury have emphasised that New Zealand
may be too small in terms of current world production
patterns to reap sufficient scale economies to have high
and strongly growing incomes. While we produce quality
commodities, skilled labour and good ideas, we do not
have the scale of industry to add the same value to these
raw inputs as can occur in larger economies. Thus our
skilled labour, in particular, is drawn offshore to where
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it can add greater value and so capture the benefits in
terms of higher remuneration.
To examine this factor further, the Appendix to this
paper presents some preliminary econometric results
using Maddison’s data studying the relationship between
population growth and GDP growth over time and
across countries. The results support the growing
international evidence that enlarging our population
(most likely through increased immigration) would be
beneficial not just for growth, but also for per capita
living standards.
The Appendix analyses the relationship between
GDP growth and population growth across twenty
developed countries after allowing for the effects of a
number of other factors influencing the growth rate.7 It
finds that between 1950 and 1973 a 1% increase in
population tended to be associated with a 1.39% increase
in GDP, thus being associated with a rise in per capita
GDP of 0.39%. Between 1973 and 1998, virtually the
same relationship is found, with the strength of the
association being 1.46%. The stability in this relationship
across 50 years and across 20 countries suggests – in
developed countries at least – that population growth
may result in countries reaping scale economies that lead
to improved per capita living standards.
If this link were causal, one aspect of New Zealand’s
slow GDP growth (relative, say, to Australia’s) can be
isolated. As indicated above, New Zealand’s population
grew by 1.45% p.a. between 1950 and 1998. If, instead,
our population had grown at Australia’s annual rate of
1.74%, our population would have reached 4.37 million
by 1998 compared with its actual level of 3.81 million.
Applying the estimated scale economies derived from
the cross-country study (using a scale factor of 1.4),
GDP would have been 21% higher and GDP per capita
would have been 5.6% higher in 1998 than was the case.
It is possible, however, that the link may not be causal;
rather, it may be reversed, with higher growth leading to
greater migration and population growth. While the
influence is expected to be bi-directional, we can test
whether population growth leads to subsequent GDP
growth and, especially, to subsequent growth in per capita
living standards. Again, some preliminary work along
these lines is presented in the Appendix. This more
detailed study covers New Zealand, Australia and Canada.
It examines the relationship between annual GDP growth
and prior population growth across the three countries.
Whether the relationship is studied for all three
countries or just for New Zealand, the results point to
population growth having a pronounced short- and long-
run effect on subsequent GDP growth. In New Zealand,
in particular, the short-run (one year) effect of a 1%
increase in population may be as much as a 1% change
in real GDP. (Thus there is no negative short-term effect
on per capita GDP arising from a larger population.)
This effect is most likely to be realised through a boost
to housing and other service provision (as was evident in
Auckland in the mid-1990s). The effect on GDP may
grow to between 1.2% and 1.7% over time, resulting in
higher per capita living standards as population increases.
New Zealand is not a small country by area; thus our
‘smallness’ comes about through the size of our
population. Following World War Two, the New Zealand
government actively sought to increase New Zealand’s
population through assisted migration, which succeeded
in attracting a large number of migrants from the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands and elsewhere. Migration is
thus, to some extent, a policy choice variable. It is
determined both by how accommodating we are to
immigration requests and also how active we are in
supporting migrants potentially wishing to come to New
Zealand. If greater inward migration were considered
beneficial for New Zealand, strong emphasis could be
given to considering active support for migrants, along
the lines of the post-war scheme (but possibly from non-
traditional country sources). Another policy could be
to open up immigration to older migrants than those
currently encouraged, as in the Buckingham proposal
noted above. Additionally, New Zealand could target
foreign students studying here. Almost by definition,
these students will be skilled. Automatic permanent
resident status could be conferred on all graduating
students, relieving those who wish to apply from
bureaucratic problems, and encouraging others to
consider staying who had not already considered
doing so.8
Increased Savings
Increased domestic investment raises the amount of
capital available for production, so raising the level of
national output. However, it must be financed either out
of domestic or offshore savings. If it is financed out of
offshore savings, a balance of payments current account
deficit (equal to the investment-savings gap) results.
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Claus et al (2001) document that New Zealand has a
low net national savings rate relative to other developed
countries. We also have consistently large balance of
payments deficits that, at times, might act as a brake on
expansionary policies, especially at times when such
policies might be useful to combat a nascent economic
downturn. This “balance of payments constraint”, arising
from our poor savings rate, may be one factor causing
greater volatility in New Zealand’s growth performance
relative to all other developed countries (Skilling, 2001).
Claus et al find, however, that savings rates do not
appear to be correlated internationally with economic
performance. These findings may be due to an inability
to distinguish the experiences of countries with active as
against passive savings policies. A country with high
expected growth will (in the absence of specific pro-
savings policies) tend to generate low savings rates as
people spend now in anticipation of high future earnings.
On the other hand, a country which seeks to counter low
expected growth through a policy of forced domestic
savings directed to increasing domestic investment may
obtain high growth performance as a result of these
policies and at the same time have high savings rates.
Thus high growth countries can have either high or low
savings rates depending on their predisposition to growth
and on their policies towards savings.
Singapore is an example of a country that explicitly
embarked on a high savings policy to increase economic
growth. It did so primarily through its state-run Central
Provident Fund (CPF), which sought to increase national
savings and domestic investment, while at the same time
build funds to pay for people’s long-term social needs.
This scheme requires most workers to save 33% of their
income via a government-run fund. Workers aged below
55 years of age contribute 20% of their salary while
their employer contributes a further 20%. Thus a
worker earning say $1,000 per week (before CPF and
other tax deductions) has ‘full income’ of $1,200 per
week (equal to their pre-tax income plus the employer’s
contribution) of which $400 (33%) is compulsory
forwarded to the CPF.9
A large proportion of these savings is invested within
Singapore (principally through investments in private
sector firms based in Singapore).10 This policy has
greatly raised the capital base of the country since 1960.
Singapore’s average ratio (in percentage terms) of
national savings to national output (S/Y)11 and of
investment to national output (I/Y) over the past three
decades12 is given in Table 2, which also presents the
average annual percentage growth in real GDP per
capita (RGDPP) in each of these decades.
Table 2: Singapore Savings, Investment and
Per Capita Growth
Decade S/Y I/Y RGDPP
1970s 28.1 35.6 7.8
1980s 41.9 40.0 5.2
1990s 47.7 34.7 4.2
Singapore’s savings and investment ratios are very
high compared with other industrialised countries. (For
example, the S/Y ratio over the 1990s in Australia,
Canada and New Zealand – measured on the same basis
– was 21.8%, 20.5% and 21.7% respectively.) The result
is that labour productivity (output per worker) has risen
extremely strongly, although total factor productivity
(output per units of capital and labour) has risen more
slowly. Output per capita (RGDPP) has risen extremely
strongly throughout the last three decades, even though
by the start of the 1990s Singapore had already become
an economically developed country.13
The Singapore experience is an example of a country
choosing to implement a policy designed to boost long-
term production while forgoing shorter-term
consumption. Consumption was depressed by the
compulsory savings scheme, although consumption per
head now is almost certainly far higher than it would
have been in the absence of the policy, given the huge
growth in incomes over the past 30 years. One generation
was ‘penalised’ by the policy, but all future generations
have benefited. In standard discounted terms, the
Singaporean approach may not have been warranted: the
poor record on total factor productivity indicates
(according to the standard model) that Singapore “over-
invested”.14 However, it has led eventually to a high
income country which can now afford to provide high
quality health, education and other services, which
less wealthy countries cannot afford. Further, it can
Source for Tables 2 & 3: IMF International Financial Statistics
Yearbook 1999 (updated for 1998 figures where necessary
by IMF August 2000 IFS) using series for nominal private
(or household) consumption (line 96), nominal government
consumption (line 91), nominal gross fixed capital formation
(line 93), nominal GDP (line 99b.c), real GDP (line 99b.r)
and population (line 99z). Savings is equal to GDP
less consumption.
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now attract top quality migrants, which hitherto were
more difficult to attract, drawn by the affluent lifestyle.
New Zealand arguably remains on a low-growth
trajectory that will not jump to a new higher trajectory
solely through adopting market-oriented policies. It is
likely (as postulated by Skilling) that there are multiple
equilibria. One option is to remain on our current
trajectory with a low population (including skilled
emigration), low capital and slow growth economy.
Another option is to seek actively to boost population
(through the measures discussed above) and to boost
investment and savings. If the latter is desired, the most
obvious way to achieve this (as in other countries) is
to link this policy to a private or public social
security fund. This is particularly important for the
future business outlook if future social expenditure
costs are projected to rise (as they are) through an
ageing population.
The New Zealand parliament recently took the
decision to lock in future superannuation entitlements. If
this lock-in is taken as given (and politically only one
small party opposed the lock-in), there is a much increased
need for a national savings policy – not only for business
now, but especially (by preventing significant future tax
hikes) for business in future. The national savings policy
may be based around either a private or a public scheme.
A compulsory private scheme was overwhelmingly
rejected by the New Zealand electorate in the last term
of government, and a public scheme (New Zealand
Superannuation Fund) is now being established.
International experience suggests that either public or
compulsory private schemes of these types have some
positive effect on national savings rates.15 If the
compulsory private option remains politically off the
agenda, there therefore appears considerable merit in
supporting NZSF (provided governance arrangements
are appropriate) as a vehicle to help boost national
savings and to prevent crippling tax increases in future
that would further inhibit business expansion. The only
other option is to reduce commitments to superannuation
entitlements (and other implicit entitlements – e.g.
to health) which politically does not currently
appear feasible.
One option that is completely infeasible – and which
would result in the worst of all possible worlds for future
business growth – is to support current superannuation
and related entitlements into the future and not to
support either a compulsory private or public fund.
The consequent, easily anticipated future tax hikes could
permanently stifle business growth.
Encouraging Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship is a crucial ingredient for an
innovative and dynamic economy, and evidence
suggests that New Zealand is an entrepreneurial
society. Recently released results from the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey demonstrate
that New Zealand has the highest rate of “opportunity
entrepreneurship” in the world (Frederick and
Carswell, 2001).16 Opportunity entrepreneurs are those
people “who spot a hot business opportunity and go
after it” (they are distinguished from “necessity
entrepreneurs” who create self-employment because
of job-loss). Women and Maori are shown to be highly
entrepreneurial relative to international and New
Zealand norms.
These results are consistent with the prevalence of
small businesses in New Zealand. Simmons (2001)
shows that New Zealand business is characterised by
a large number of small firms. In 2001, there were
234,000 firms employing a total of 1,380,000 people,
an average per firm of fewer than 6 people. The bulk
of firms (84%) employ 5 or fewer people. Less than
2% of firms have 50 or more employees. This
prevalence of small businesses is unusual within the
OECD (although Italy, Netherlands and the Czech
Republic are in some respects similar), but it is entirely
consistent with the entrepreneurship picture outlined
in the GEM survey.
These results suggest that there do not appear to be
major policy issues surrounding the prevalence of
business start-ups in New Zealand. These start-ups are
already at a high level.
The issues instead surround the growth of small
firms once they have been established. The company
statistics documented by Simmons indicate that most
New Zealand small firms either stay small or expire; few
grow to significant sizes. For instance, between 1996
and 1999, only 13% of small firms (those initially with
five or fewer employees) became larger, 37% stayed the
same size, 11% shrank and 39% perished. By contrast,
40% of large firms (those initially with at least 100
employees) became larger. Also, medium-sized firms
tend to have higher value added per employee (and
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hence contribute more strongly to overall living
standards) than do small firms, but it is the latter that
predominate in New Zealand.
Three responses can be considered to encourage firm
expansion especially within the myriad of small firms.
Changes to the taxation regime to encourage expansion,
and greater economic integration with Australia and
other countries to encourage exports are considered in
succeeding sections. A third response – to change attitudes
– is more qualitative. The KnowledgeWave conference
identified New Zealanders’ somewhat grudging
acceptance of successful business-people as a matter to
be addressed. The high scores for entrepreneurship and
high levels of business start-ups in New Zealand suggest
that the problem is not one of lack of acceptance of
business people, but perhaps more a lack of acceptance
of ‘big business’ people.
People may admire successful builders in much the
same way as they admire Jonah Lomu – as successful
individuals. However, once the builder is employing 50,
100 or 1,000 people, they become suspect. This, of
course, is speculation, although some of the Values
Survey responses are consistent with this speculation
(especially the 70% response to the proposition that “this
country is run by a few big interests looking out for
themselves”, and the strong majority stating that there
should be “tighter government regulation of big
companies and multinationals”).
There is little that public policy can do about this
attitudinal issue, except not to add to it (by unjust
criticisms of successful businesses). Government can
also seek to remove impediments to business expansion
through streamlining planning approval processes that
may inhibit expansion of some businesses (and provoke
an ‘us’ against ‘them’ confrontation at times). Attitudes
are more likely to be changed over long periods of time
through school programmes such as those pioneered by
the Enterprise New Zealand Trust which emphasise the
role of business in individuals’ and the nation’s life.
Taxation
As long as public expenditure remains as currently
projected, New Zealand tax rates will have to remain at
moderately high levels. This is one reason to review
certain areas of government expenditure. One area still
in need of review is New Zealand superannuation (NZS)
which, in 1999, absorbed 5.45% of GDP (Cox, 2001), a
proportion which is projected to rise further as the
population ages. Many people who receive NZS are still
working or have high savings and so receive a transfer
payment from government, funded by taxes, that they
do not require. NZS entitlements therefore need to be
reviewed. However, as noted above, it is politically
unlikely this will be done in the near future given that
both major political parties have recently voted in
Parliament to protect existing entitlements into
the future.
Even if the level of government expenditures, and
hence taxes, cannot be reduced significantly, the structure
of taxes can be altered to encourage expansion. Referring
back to the structure of New Zealand business, the
current level and structure of taxation does not appear to
be holding back business establishment. However, it
may be holding back business expansion, especially for
smaller businesses.
Optimal taxation theory, which takes into account
equity preferences of policy-makers, indicates that
low earners should be taxed at low rates, with the
tax scale being progressive at low to medium
income levels. However, at very high income levels,
efficiency considerations then take priority and the tax
scale should decline as income rises above a
certain level.
This is the model essentially seen in Singapore and
in other countries with social insurance systems. The
contributions to Singapore’s Central Provident Fund
are capped once earnings reach $6,000 per month.
This means that the marginal tax rate on ‘full income’,
which starts at 35% (for the first $9,000 p.a.), reaching
a marginal rate of 46.7% on full income of $86,400,
then falls to 16%, although it rises progressively
thereafter to reach 28% on full income above
$514,400. The average tax rate rises from 35% to
approximately 42% before declining towards 28% on
very high incomes.
Some European social insurance systems follow a
similar model. For example, in the Netherlands a
mandatory social insurance scheme for people below a
certain income level is funded by a flat levy of 8.1% of
employees’ incomes up to a maximum of 55,900 guilders.
New Zealand also follows this system to a minimal
extent by capping ACC contributions once annual income
reaches $83,017 p.a., resulting in marginal tax rates
falling fractionally at that level.
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Grimes (2000), Brash (2001) and the McLeod et al
tax committee (2001) have all discussed the possibility
of declining marginal tax rates at high income levels. For
instance, marginal tax rates of between 10% and 20% at
very high income levels would encourage the expansion
of domestic businesses (especially where the business is
predominantly owned by a single or a few owners) and
would encourage the return of entrepreneurs operating
internationally to New Zealand.
There are two criticisms of this approach. First is the
empirical criticism that the loss of tax revenue from a
lowering of tax rates on high incomes would not be
compensated for by increased revenues from a larger tax
base arising from business expansion. This is an issue on
which further work is urgently required. My own
judgement is that the imposition of low marginal tax
rates on high incomes (say over $300,000 p.a.) would
provide a significant incentive to business people to
expand strongly and encourage internationally-based
entrepreneurs to establish in New Zealand, thus further
building the New Zealand tax base.
Second is the political economy criticism that
reducing marginal tax rates on high incomes is not
consistent with the wishes of the New Zealand electorate.
However, this criticism ignores the fact that social
democratic regimes in Europe do adopt such a taxation
approach through their social insurance schemes. It
appears quite justifiable (in political economy terms) to
cap individuals’ social security contributions at a certain
(high) level which ensures that they still pay far in excess
of any social insurance compensation that they may
personally receive. If New Zealand were to adopt a
social insurance model for more than just ACC (e.g. to
include also health, superannuation and unemployment
expenditures), it could use this model effectively to
reduce marginal tax rates on high incomes.
Integrating with Larger Economies
In 2001, fewer than 4% of New Zealand’s 234,000 firms
were exporters and this proportion has been falling over
time (Simmons, 2001). Yet, for a small country,
exporting is a critical source of expansion given that
the domestic market is so constrained. After adjusting
for factors such as size of economy, distance from
markets and product specialisation, international
evidence indicates that high levels of international trade
as a proportion of GDP are associated with high levels
of per capita income (Frankel and Romer, 1999). This
finding is borne out by estimates presented in the
Appendix which indicate a positive relationship between
a county’s expansion of its per capita export receipts
and its GDP growth rate (both over 1950-1973 and over
1973-1998).
New Zealand is not a particularly open economy
relative to other small countries; this may be caused by
existence of barriers to export. The step of expanding
marketing efforts into a second economy, especially
from a country as distant as is New Zealand from other
markets, involves a substantial fixed cost that may be
large relative to the existing small domestic sales of
many firms. Faced with this fixed cost and with the risk
that an incorrect calculation to expand into exporting
could place the entire firm into jeopardy, many firms
(96% in New Zealand’s case) will choose not to expand
and instead to service solely the (tiny) domestic market.
There are many sources of the fixed costs involved in
taking the step into exporting. Some are inevitable (the
price of an international flight) but some can be
diminished through policy harmonisation between
New Zealand and one or more other countries. If firms
face the same institutions and policies in their
prospective export destination as they do at home, the
costs – and especially the risks – of venturing further
afield are reduced.
One example is the choice of New Zealand to retain
its own dollar. The survey of 400 New Zealand firms’
attitudes to a currency union with Australia reported in
Grimes et al (2000) showed a substantial majority
supported adoption of an irrevocable link of the New
Zealand dollar to the Australian dollar. Support was
widespread amongst small and large firms, exporters
and importers, and firms in the manufacturing, agriculture
and services sectors. Overall, 58% of firms were positive
towards currency union with only 14% negative (the rest
were neutral). What was particularly instructive in this
survey – especially in light of the fixed cost arguments
relating to export barriers discussed above – were some
of the patterns of support for a joint dollar.
Strongest support came from firms with 11 to 20
employees with lower (but still strong) support from
firms on either side of this level. The survey indicated
that firms of this size tend to be at the threshold of
exporting: surveyed firms with 6 to 10 staff on average
export 6% of total sales, and firms with 11 to 20 staff
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export an average 7% of sales. In contrast, firms with 21
to 50 staff export 14% of total sales, and firms with over
50 staff export an even greater share. Thus there is a
substantial increase in exporting at a firm size of
about 20 employees.
This is consistent with another finding of the survey
which revealed that firms with fewer than 25 employees
find foreign exchange hedging more costly than do
larger firms, and hedge a substantially smaller proportion
of their foreign exchange exposures than do larger firms.
The survey indicates that smaller firms without specialist
in-house foreign exchange expertise consider foreign
exchange risks and associated costs a major impediment
to expansion into export markets.
The dynamic impacts of retaining an independent
currency may therefore be considerable and could help
to explain New Zealand’s relatively poor growth rate:
New Zealand firms face a major constraint on expansion
driven by the New Zealand-imposed non-tariff barrier to
trade called the New Zealand dollar. These firm-specific
costs of maintaining multiple currencies are consistent
with the international findings that trade is diminished
by the presence of multiple currencies.
The currency example is only one of a number of
potential policy areas which could usefully be harmonised
in order to reduce the significant costs involved in New
Zealand firms becoming established as exporters.
Evidence suggests that once firms expand into exporting,
there is much less evidence of barriers to expansion.
“Once firms start exporting even the smallest exporters
seem to have the same likelihood of expansion as larger
firms” (Simmons, 2001). The key, therefore, is to adopt
policies which encourage firms (or at least do not
discourage firms) to begin exporting. In many respects,
the simplest way of doing so is simply to adopt Australian
policies and institutions in all areas other than those in
which we believe New Zealand policies or institutions
are demonstrably superior. Where policies or institutions
are similar, but not the same (including the currency),
the presumption should be to adopt Australia’s practice.
This prescription becomes tied up with issues of
national sovereignty. However, the decisions to adopt
Australian policies and institutions are decisions for
New Zealand to make (and potentially to revoke if
circumstances were to change abruptly), so there is no
question of ceding sovereignty. Instead, it is a question
of New Zealand policy-makers adopting policies
which are most likely to result in the expansion of
New Zealand business activity, and hence living
standards in New Zealand. If this involves economic
union with Australia (and in my judgement, it does) then
this set of policies needs to be given urgent consideration.
Where to From Here?
If New Zealanders wish to have higher living standards
– and particularly if they wish to enjoy better health,
education and other social services – the country’s
economy needs to grow faster. There is no single magic
bullet which will achieve a sharp increase in growth;
and a climb up the international income ranks will
inevitably be slow (if it occurs at all). However, policy
can contribute to this desired turnaround. Specific
suggestions, based on the analysis above, include:
• Boost migration by: – relaunching an ‘assisted
passage’ scheme for immigrants (possibly in the
form of a tax rebate after say 3 years’ work in
New Zealand);
• – facilitating immigration by older foreigners
in certain categories (especially those with
existing wealth);
• – granting permanent residence to foreign students
who graduate with a tertiary qualification in
New Zealand.
• Boost domestic savings by supporting either the
expansion of the New Zealand Superannuation
Fund (NZSF) or the establishment of compulsory
private superannuation.
• Significantly reduce marginal tax rates on very high
incomes, possibly through the introduction of a
social insurance scheme along the lines of many
European social democratic models or a scheme
modelled on Singapore’s Central Provident Fund.
• Seek full economic union with Australia, and prior
to full union being established, seek to adopt
as many Australian laws, institutions and
business conventions as can feasibly be achieved
in short order.
It is feasible to introduce each of these policies
within a short timeframe. Other growth-oriented policies
which are not discussed here (e.g. reviewing planning
requirements for business development and reviewing
educational policies to boost achievement in maths
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and sciences, which are currently poor17) are just as
important but may take longer to implement even if
the will was there.
The importance of undertaking these policies in
order to boost our sustainable rate of business growth
cannot be over-stated unless we wish to keep becoming
poorer on the world stage. New Zealanders know that
our health system has to ration healthcare, that our
education system is under-funded relative to top quality
systems elsewhere, and that we cannot afford to play our
full part in world security because we are relatively poor.
If we want governments to deliver sustainable
improvements in these and other services, there is no
choice but to make an all-out effort to make this country
rich. In turn, this means introducing a policy environment
that makes our businesses as productive and profitable
as possible. It is a big challenge, but failing to meet this
challenge would be disastrous for the social fabric of
our society.
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Using data from Maddison (2001), we conduct a cross-
country regression18 of the annual percentage change in
each country’s GDP (DGDP) against a constant term,
CNST (to account for country-specific technological
growth), the ratio of initial GDP per capita to that of the
USA, CONV (to allow for convergence of income in
poorer countries to that in the richest country over time),
the annual percentage change in population, DPOP,
and the annual percentage change in per capita export
receipts measured in USD, DEXP (to capture the impact
of changing openness on growth). If the coefficient
on the population term equals unity, constant returns
to scale are indicated19; if the coefficient is larger
(smaller) than unity then increasing (decreasing) returns
to scale are indicated.
The regression is split into two time periods (the
precise choice of periods is dictated by the nature of
Maddison’s data) to test whether the relationship is
stable across the past fifty years. The first period is 1950-
1973, a period of generally buoyant economic conditions.
The second period is 1973-1998, a much more turbulent
period involving the two oil shocks, stagflation,
disinflation, a stock market crash and a further stock
market boom. The results of these two regressions are
presented in Table A1 (t-statistics are in brackets beneath
coefficient estimates).
The results in Table A1 indicate that, especially in
the first half of the sample, poorer countries’ GDP
tended to converge on that of the USA and also that
countries with strong per capita export growth tended to
grow more quickly. In both samples, the coefficient on
population growth is found to exceed one, indicating
increasing returns to scale. The estimate is very similar
in each period (however we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that it is equal to one in either period).
Cross-sectional regressions do not indicate causality.
To delve further into whether the population growth may
be causing per capita GDP growth, we examine three
countries with similar histories, stages of development
and reliance on commodity exports: New Zealand,
Australia and Canada. Again we look at GDP growth
over the period 1950-1998, but use annual time series
data across the three countries. The data are estimated
both as a panel20 for the three countries (with cross-
equation restrictions) and for New Zealand alone (in
case the New Zealand results are significantly different
from those of the panel).
For the New Zealand case, the estimated equation is
in a single equation cointegration format, regressing the
annual percentage change of real GDP (DGDP) on a
constant, the log of real GDP lagged one year (LGDP1),
the log of population lagged one year (LPOP1) and a
time trend (TIME) to take account of technical progress.
The t-statistic on LGDP1 is used to test for cointegration
(i.e. for a long-run relationship), and long-run coefficients
are solved out for each equation. For the cross-country
case, the same format is adopted, with the coefficient on
each variable (other than the constant) constrained to be
the same across the three countries (i.e. we are assuming
that technological change and increasing returns to scale
act in the same manner across the three countries).
The results for New Zealand are presented in Table
A2; the cross-country results are presented in Table A3.
For each of the unconstrained estimates, the t-statistic on
LGDP1 exceeds 4.00 (consistent with a cointegrating
relationship) and hence the long-run elasticity of GDP to
POP (E
 GDP,POP) is presented in the table. In each case the
coefficient on TIME is negative (implying negative
technological progress). It is likely that TIME and
LPOP1 are highly collinear. Hence we also present the
estimates with the long-run coefficient on TIME
Appendix
Some Preliminary
Econometric Analysis
Table A1: Cross-country GDP Growth Regression
DGDP on CNST CONV DPOP DEXP R2
1950-1973 4.38 -4.25 1.39 0.148 0.75
(4.00) (5.00) (4.48) (2.12)
1973-1998 0.51 -1.15 1.46 0.224 0.65
(0.44) (1.41) (4.04) (2.99)
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restricted to a range of specified levels to ascertain the
effect on the long-run POP coefficient. The first line in
each equation reports the results for the unrestricted
coefficient on TIME (with the long-run coefficient being
reported); the following four estimates give the equation
estimates where the long-run coefficient on TIME is
restricted to 0%, 0.5%, 1%, 1.5% p.a. respectively; the
final line presents the estimate using the long-run value
on TIME which gives E
 GDP,POP = 1.0; t-statistics for the
short-run estimates are reported in brackets, short-run
coefficients on TIME and CNST are omitted for clarity.
The unrestricted New Zealand estimates suggest
huge increasing returns to scale: a 1% increase in
technological progress of –0.21% p.a. which is not
realistic. As the long-run coefficient on TIME is raised,
the estimate of E
 GDP,POP declines. The value of TIME for
which constant returns to scale is indicated is 1.19% p.a.
However, an F-test rejects the validity of this restriction,
implying that technological change (in New Zealand at
least) has been at a lower rate, and also implying that
there are increasing returns to scale of GDP with respect
to population.
The unrestricted panel estimates again suggest huge
increasing returns to scale, with a 1% increase in
population resulting in an approximate 2.5% increase in
GDP. However, the short-run effect is now smaller.
Table A2: New Zealand Estimates for DGDP (1951-98)
TIME LGDP1 LPOP1 R2 E
 GDP,POP
-0.0021 -0.54 1.11 0.33 2.08
(4.53) (4.38)
0.00 -0.53 1.03 0.32 1.93
(4.44) (4.28)
0.005 -0.43 0.67 0.26 1.55
(3.71) (3.50)
0.010 -0.29 0.34 0.17 1.16
(2.80) (1.61)
0.015 -0.19 0.14 0.12 0.73
(2.10) (1.61)
0.0119 -0.25 0.25 0.15 1.00
(2.51) (2.15)
population resulting in approximately a 2% increase in
GDP. Even the short-run (one year) coefficient is greater
than one. However, the equation also suggests
Table A3: Panel (New Zealand, Australia, Canada) Estimates for DGDP (1951-98)
TIME LGDP1 LPOP1 R2 E
 GDP,POP
-0.0074 -0.15 0.37 0.18 2.51
(4.01) (3.71)
0.00 -0.15 0.30 0.17 2.04
(3.74) (3.40)
0.005 -0.13 0.21 0.15 1.70
(3.29) (2.88)
0.010 -0.10 0.13 0.14 1.32
(2.75) (2.22)
0.015 -0.07 0.06 0.12 0.9
(2.22) (1.50)
0.0139 -0.08 0.08 0.12 1.00
(2.33) (1.67)
Again the unrestricted equation ‘finds’ negative
technological progress over time, and as the long-run
coefficient on TIME is increased, the returns to scale
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parameter on population declines. Constant returns to
scale coincides with an imposed rate of technological
progress of 1.39% p.a., but again an F-test rejects the
validity of this restriction, implying that increasing
returns to scale exist.
The time-series and cross-country estimates reported
here are no more than preliminary. However, the
consistency in findings using two quite different methods
and two different samples over a half-century period at
least creates a prima facie case to investigate further the
possibility of increasing returns to scale for GDP with
respect to population size.
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Endnotes
1 Expenditures in this section are measured in
“purchasing power parity” (PPP) terms using data
in Ministry of Health, 2000. PPP-based measures
adjust for different living costs across countries. The
29 OECD countries, in rank order of per capita
health expenditure, are: United States, Switzerland,
Luxembourg, Germany, Canada, Iceland, France,
Denmark, Norway, Australia, Netherlands, Austria,
Belgium, Sweden, Japan, Italy, Finland, United
Kingdom, New Zealand, Ireland, Greece, Spain,
Portugal, Czech Republic, Korea, Hungary, Poland,
Mexico and Turkey.
2 Letting LTOT be the natural logarithm of total per
capita health expenditure, LPUB be the natural
logarithm of publicly funded per capita health
expenditure and LGDP be the natural logarithm of
per capita GDP in each country, the two cross-
country regressions (each for 1998) are as follows
(with t-statistics in brackets):
LTOT = -6.93 + 1.44 LGDP R2 = 0.93
(9.09) (18.65)
LPUB = -7.88 + 1.51 LGDP R2 = 0.94
(10.83) (20.42)
3 In some cases, data series are presented covering
developments over the past 2000 years! All
references henceforth to GDP and GDP per capita
use Maddison’s figures.
4 Measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
5 The three other choices were “strong defence
forces”, “people having more say about how things
are done in their jobs and communities”, and
“making our cities and countryside more beautiful”.
6 At least, I assert there is confusion, since following
the latter set of policies appears inconsistent with
achieving stronger economic growth.
7 Other factors include the initial starting level of each
country’s per capita GDP relative to that of the
United States, the rate of per capita export growth
and a country-specific allowance for technological
growth. The twenty countries are Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United
States, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
8 I believe that this suggestion may first have been
put forward by Asia 2000 Director, Tim Groser.
9 The maximum monthly contribution is $1,200 based
on a salary of $6,000 per month. These and further
details on the CPF are available from Singapore
Ministry of Information and the Arts, Singapore:
Facts and Pictures, 1999, pp 105-109. See also the
CPF’s web-page: www.cpf.gov.sg.
10 Individuals can also withdraw some of their holdings
in the CPF to invest directly in approved avenues.
11 The figure presented here, and for corresponding
figures in subsequent sections, is the total of private
plus government consumption to national output.
12 The 1990s decade is for the nine years to 1998.
13 Hence, ‘convergence’ to rich countries’ living
standards cannot be used to explain the fast
1990s growth.
14 The extraordinarily high savings rates of the 1990s
accompanied by a significantly lower growth
dividend suggests that there are limits to what can
be achieved through extremely high savings ratios.
15 See Hubbard and Skinner, 1996.
16 Countries in the ‘world’ survey, in order of
opportunity entrepreneurship are: New Zealand,
Australia, Mexico, USA, Ireland, Brazil, Korea,
Hungary, Italy, Finland, Canada, Norway, Denmark,
South Africa, Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Netherlands, UK, Russia, Germany, Poland,
Singapore, India, France, Belgium, Japan and Israel.
17 See Education Review Office, 2000.
18 The countries that are included are the 20 countries
listed by Maddison as Western European countries
plus “4 Western offshoots”, being the countries
listed in endnote 7.
19 Even though the change in capital stock is not
included in this equation, the same interpretation
of the population coefficient is valid, provided the
economy is on a balanced growth path.
20 Estimation is within a single stacked equation
format.
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The most powerful mechanism we have to re-invent
New Zealand’s place in the world economy is already
hard at work. But until a few years ago, we knew very
little about it; worse, it turns out that some of what we
thought we knew we may have got badly wrong; and
there remains much more to learn.
The mechanism I have in mind does not involve
specifying some desired future portfolio of industries
and world market shares and working towards that goal.
Instead, New Zealand firms, left to their own devices,
are building positions of remarkable strength in global
markets that defy a priori prediction: a world leader in
rock-crushing machinery in Matamata (Barmac); an
80% share of the global market for magnet arrays for ion
implantation of all silicon chips made (Buckley Systems);
a maker of ore sampling mills used in 1000 laboratories
in 70 countries around the world (Rocklabs); the biggest
movie project ever (Peter Jackson’s Lord of the Rings).
Dozens of New Zealand ventures like these are
growing out into the world in market niches of their own
discovery, differentiating themselves from much larger
global competitors with complex portfolios of capabilities
that are unique to themselves. When they lock into
global markets with their innovative products, they
grow ten-fold in brief periods of rapid growth we call
‘the gusher’. Collectively, they are – I suggest – the best
mechanism we have to discover how New Zealand can
create economic value from its distinctive array of
natural, human, and cultural resources, and exploit these
discoveries to create growth for the economy.
Over the last three years a team of researchers from
Victoria University’s Business School have undertaken
an intensive study of firms like these. Called Competitive
Advantage New Zealand (CANZ), and funded by the
PGSF with further assistance from the New Zealand
Trade Development Board and Victoria University, the
project’s aim is to build new theory about how firms like
these create world-class competitive capability over
time. We have yet to formally test the explanatory power
of our theory of small firm internationalisation (for
reasons I will explain below), but we have presented our
ideas to hundreds of managers in dozens of seminars
around the country, where they have received much
informal support. In June of this year we published a
book-length report on our work, ‘World Famous in New
Zealand’, where you will find the detail that cannot be
included here.
I want to report here some of the insights into these
remarkable firms that have been produced by the CANZ
project. First I am going to look at the current positions
of strength from which they are growing their
international businesses. It turns out that these draw
important strength from the ‘New Zealand-ness’ of their
experience. Second, I will look at the growth path they
have followed – their internationalisation strategy. These
too have taken forms dictated by New Zealand’s
smallness and isolation, and are quite unlike the
internationalisation paths of received theory. Third, I
will ask what we might do to help more of these precious
companies develop. Here I will focus on one particular
transition that carries distinctive risks for the firms that
go through it. There are grounds to suspect that many
firms are deterred from realising their full offshore
potential by the challenges of this transition.
Because they grow in places and ways that we cannot
pre-conceive, we run significant risks of suboptimising
the potential of these firms if we constrain their growth
to fit into some pre-ordained plan or theme. Hence the
title for this address, borrowed from Ian Taylor, founder
of one of these world-leading New Zealand enterprises,
“Bugger the Boxing, 
Keep Pouring the Concrete”:
Exploring the Foundations of
New Zealand’s New Economy
Colin Campbell-Hunt
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Animation Research. “Bugger the boxing: keep pouring
the concrete” sums up the process I suggest these
companies are using to re-build the foundations of
the New Zealand economy: flowing out from current
positions of strength, constantly leveraging and
building on their accumulated competitive capabilities,
and growing from that base in whatever directions
show promise.
Foundations of Competitive
Advantage
How do exemplar firms like Tait Electronics, the
Gallagher Group and Montana Wines achieve advantage
over world-class competition?
In the first instance, we went looking for the attributes
that contemporary resource-based theory suggests can
differentiate a firm from its competitors in ways that are
hard to copy, and thus allow the firm to build sustainable
competitive advantage. We found clear evidence in the
development of these businesses that they base their
advantage on many of these foundations:
• relationships of mutual cooperation, dependency
and benefit with suppliers, distributors, employees
and customers (where the advantage could be called
a reputation);
• innovations that can be defended from competitive
response and ‘locked in’;
• organisational processes that encourage learning;
• mastery of multiple technologies;
• unique organisational cultures.
What was unexpected was that these leading firms
typically make use of several of these sources of
differentiable advantage: their advantage is broad-based.
But we found that a full understanding of the
competitive appeal of these firms must also include
attributes that stem from their unique experience as New
Zealand firms:
• In every case, these firms have developed
capabilities from their New Zealand setting that later
served to differentiate them from offshore
competition – for example, the early development
of a mobile radio network by the Post Office that
fostered a mobile radio industry here at a very early
stage in the technology’s development; and early
experience in deregulation that helped companies
like Nuplex to lead industry consolidation on both
sides of the Tasman.
• They also tell us that they capture advantage from
cultural traits that are distinctive to New Zealand:
an ability to ‘do more with less’ that often makes
these firms much faster to market and very cost
competitive despite their small size and isolation;
self-reliance and a willingness to have a go; a
breadth of experience that larger, more specialised
competitors cannot groom into their people; and
an openness and breadth in social interactions
that allows New Zealanders to assemble and
operate diverse teams more readily than larger,
stratified societies.
• They are led (over long periods) by people with
attributes that suit the distinctive challenges these
companies grow through: they are innovators,
dynamos of energy, they are international in outlook,
and have strong interpersonal values with a huge
capacity for personal growth.
• Their most powerful competitive capability, they
tell us, is the capacity of these relatively small firms
to create what we call ‘coherence’ across the broad
range of their activities, and thus produce a
consistent, integrated value package to the customer.
Their much larger, bureaucratically-organised
competitors find it hard to achieve the same single-
minded focus across the whole organisation.
The resource-based view suggests that firms can
only establish sustainable advantage on the basis of
attributes that are to a degree unique to the firm, and that
competition will find hard to copy. New Zealand is thus
most unlikely to create distinctive advantage by copying
business models developed in Pittsburg and Rotterdam
by much larger businesses. Instead the exemplar New
Zealand firms we have studied have found ways to turn
unique attributes of their local experience into sources of
differentiable advantage offshore. This is what makes
them so valuable as pathfinders for the country’s
economic development.
Paths to International Success
When we turn from sources of competitive advantage
to the strategies these exemplary firms have used to grow
internationally, we find the same distinctive New
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Zealand realities at work. These exemplary New Zealand
firms have had to find ways to grow global businesses
from a tiny and isolated home base. The result has been
internationalisation paths that are radically different from
those predicted by theory developed for much larger and
more integrated economies.
Contrary to current theory, the more global the scope
of these firms, the more likely they are to have
manufacturing concentrated in one facility at home; and
the less likely they are to use their own marketing and
sales staff in offshore markets. Companies that are
primarily regional in scope, with the bulk of their business
on both sides of the Tasman, in every case have
manufacturing facilities in both countries and prefer
direct sales representation. These preferences are the
exact opposite to what contemporary internationalisation
theory would predict, but they follow logically from the
distinctive paths these firms have created to grow from
their small isolated home market.
Furthermore, where current theory says there is one
path to internationalisation and firms differ in how far
they are along it, what we have seen in our New Zealand
exemplars is a binary choice: about half of the firms are
leaders on a global scale, who grew quickly to become
active in 50-60 countries worldwide; and half are what
we call ‘regional leaders’, with leading positions on both
sides of the Tasman but with only minor market positions
beyond that. The ‘unusual’ manufacturing and sales
preferences adopted by these firms stem from the logic
inherent in these two strategies:
• Global leaders in our study have, in every case,
opened the door to global markets with a New
Zealand produced proprietary innovation. The role
that innovation plays in leading the international
growth of these firms is one of the key lessons to
be learned from their success. To deal with the
rapid ‘gusher’ of sales growth, these firms have been
virtually forced to focus their entire efforts on
their leading product success. To quickly get the
global market coverage their innovative product
demands, they use indirect means of market
representation through independent dealers.
And because these very focused, but very
globalised, firms remain relatively small (employing
a few hundred people rather than several thousand)
they retain a preference for indirect market
representation offshore and consolidation of
manufacturing in the home market.
• Regional leaders have not gone through this radical
strategic reconfiguration. Their product lines remain
broad. For them a key capability is that of cross-
selling their products to the relatively small
customer base of the Australasian market. For this
reason, they value direct customer representation.
While innovation has been an important part of the
competitive success of these firms, they have not
typically produced world-leading innovations (or
if they have, they have chosen not to pursue their
global potential). The result is products with a
relatively low ratio of high value embedded
knowledge to bulk, and a preference for
manufacture or assembly on both sides of the
Tasman (two of the companies in this group make
furniture, another is a producer of volume
chemicals).
Just as these firms have built advantage on attributes
that stem from their distinctively New Zealand roots, so
too they have discovered internationalisation strategies
that take account of the New Zealand reality of being one
of the smallest and most isolated economies on earth. This
is not to say that these firms are ignorant of best practice
overseas. Quite the contrary; many leaders spend a
hundred days or more each year offshore, and they make
full use of trends in the international industry to guide
their own firm’s development. But the strategies these
leaders have invented to grow their businesses offshore
have had to respect the distinctive New Zealand realities
of isolation and small scale in ways that have simply not
been observed or theorised in much larger economies.
Growing More ‘Global Leaders’
In this last section I want to focus on the distinctive
challenges and risks faced by tiny New Zealand
firms when they confront the possibility of taking
their world-leading innovations into global markets.
There are many crucial transitions in the growth of
firms. I choose this focus because getting through the
‘going global’ transition successfully produces
enormous growth for the firm and the economy; and
also because its challenges seem likely to be
distinctively difficult for New Zealand firms
to surmount.
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The salient characteristics of this transition, as they
emerge from the experience of companies in the CANZ
project, are:
• A need to exploit the global potential of the
innovative product rapidly and establish a leading
position before imitating competition captures first-
mover advantages. For example, Bill Gallagher built
a European distribution network, and negotiated
standards-access to all major European markets, in
a frenetic period of just 3-4 years.
• The firm’s ability to protect its IP on a global scale
is severely limited until it has achieved the growth
its IP promises. Several firms in our study do not
even try to protect their IP, or can afford to police
only the most salient breaches.
• A huge scale-up in operations. Scott Technology’s
first offshore installation of its innovative whiteware
production lines was for a system 20 times bigger
that anything it had previously done. Pressure
on capital, quality, delivery and the firm’s
precious coherence becomes overwhelming
during these periods.
• The firm is simultaneously exploring many new
markets and the market potential of a new
untried product.
• Each of these conditions represents a significant
source of risk in its own right. For tiny New Zealand
firms, the going global transition engages all of these
sources of risk at the same time.
• The transition to global leadership is not another
step in a series of incremental stages but a radical
transformation of the firm’s entire scope and
business model. In the language of systems theory,
it is a sudden and radical bifurcation from one
attractor of strategic conditions into another that is
quite unfamiliar to the firm. Technically, it is a
catastrophe, albeit a promising one.
• The experience of the exemplars we have worked
with is that New Zealand’s venture capital market
has yet to develop to play an active role in helping
firms through these radical transitions with
a combination of capital and some very
distinctive expertise.
The going global transition has been a
crucial transforming experience in the competitive
development of all global leaders in the CANZ study.
While not all of them experienced all of the challenges
listed here, all have experienced several of them. Some
have managed, or been forced, to pace the speed of their
expansion offshore (Montana Wines). Others have
limited the geographic scope of their expansion to what
they could support from their own resources (PEC’s
electronically-controlled petrol pumps). All report that
the stresses and risks of the transition have been intense.
We simply do not know how many firms have made
this transition over the past five or ten years; nor whether
more companies or less are making it now than 10 years
ago; nor whether the transition is getting easier or harder.
But to the extent that a government seeks to focus its
interventions to support economic growth, encouraging
firms through this transition deserves attention for the
following reasons:
• The risks involved are inherently very high at the
level of the firm and may require large portfolios
to manage. There is evidence that an adequate
market to manage this risk has yet to develop in
New Zealand.
• Assistance to these globally tiny firms to protect
the IP of the innovations that drive their
internationalisation has the potential to increase their
ultimate share of the global market significantly.
• When successful, the growth potential of this
transition is very high as firms expand rapidly up to
a global scale – the typical expansion factor during
the gusher is ten-fold.
Exploring the Foundations of
New Zealand’s New Economy
I have suggested that we look at the country’s community
of internationalising, entrepreneurial firms as the best
device New Zealand has to discover how to turn the
country’s distinctive assets and capabilities into
economic value, wealth and jobs. The CANZ project
suggests that this is exactly what our leading
international success stories have done, and that they
have done it with distinctive strategies that respect the
special realities of growing a business of global scale
from a tiny home market base. Those special realities
also involve some very distinctive risks that may impede
New Zealand’s small-scale internationalising firms from
exploiting the full value of the innovations that launch
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them into global markets. It seems desirable to find ways
to increase the number of firms going through this
transition successfully.
I have suggested too that the businesses these firms
discover can be expected to include many (delightful)
surprises and take us in unexpected directions. I suggest
that it would be foolish to pervert or impede any of these:
“bugger the boxing, just keep pouring the concrete”. In
a global economy that can helpfully be thought of as an
enormous complex adaptive system, the search strategy
appropriate to a national economy seeking to re-
invent itself must initially be broad: we need more
concrete mixers.
But if this entrepreneurial community is the economic
pathfinder that will explore for us what potential we
have in the global economy, it is perhaps alarming that
we know nothing about its size and the effectiveness of
its functioning. To overwork the metaphor, we do not
know how many concrete mixers we have going, nor
whether there are more or fewer of them than we had
before, nor whether they are working better or worse
now than before. The lack of data on these firms is the
reason we have not yet tested the general validity of our
theory. I suppose you would expect an academic to end
with a call for more research, but in the new research
funding environment, it is people like you who influence
where the funding goes. Your call.
Further Information on the
CANZ Project:
• Project website is http://www.vuw.ac.nz/fca/
research/canz, including several company histories
produced during the project.
• ‘World famous in New Zealand: How New
Zealand’s Leading Firms Became World Class
Competitors’, published by Auckland University
Press, June 2001.
Only the author is responsible for the content of this paper.
Other members of the CANZ project are John Brocklesby, Jane
Bryson, Sylvie Chetty, Lawrie Corbett, Urs Daellenbach, Sally
Davenport, John Davies, Ken Deans, Deborah Jones, Sid Huff
and Pat Walsh.
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I am addressing the key question of how to obtain buy-
in across the wider community to growth strategies that
could deliver benefits to all New Zealanders.
First of all, I welcome the implicit acknowledge-
ment that community ‘buy-in’ is a pre-requisite to
achieving a growth strategy. I think it was Craig
Norgate who made the point at the Knowledge Wave
Conference, that change leaders ‘must take every-
body along’.
This is not a day for looking backwards but I will do
so briefly to explain the significant level of cynicism in
the community about new ways to prosperity. New
Zealanders have been through tremendous change during
the past decade. In my own case, I negotiated many of
those changes in rail and ports. In ports in the late 1980s,
I persuaded our union to embrace and negotiate change
positively. Our members accepted that and re-structured
long-standing agreements and work practices to
deliver huge efficiency gains in ports, but with some
productivity sharing incentives for the smaller workforce
which remained.
And then many of the same employers used the ECA
unilaterally to vary the deals which had been done and
reduce the wages and conditions again. That has been a
common experience during the past decade.
More than anything else, I think workers felt that
they were not respected, because they were seen as a cost
rather than an asset.
And those of us who have read Paul Dalziell’s
comparative study will know that his view is that the
overall effect of the 1990s policies was negative.
Although the New Zealand and Australian economies
tracked along the same prior to 1984, they diverged
markedly after that. If the New Zealand economy had
grown at its previous trend rate, or matched Australia
over the same period, output would be a third higher than
it is now. The amounts of personal and public income
associated with this are staggering. At current tax
rates the extra income would have generated an extra
$11 billion of tax revenue per annum – enough to
halve net government debt, or double spending on
health and education.
The point I am making is that there is a general
feeling, and considerable evidence, that the New
Zealand experiment failed. Any suggestion that it
should be resurrected, as some speakers seemed to
suggest at the Knowledge Wave Conference, would be
strongly resisted.
Having said that, it is not true to suggest that unions
do not support economic growth. I was intrigued by
Simon Carlaw’s claim in the invitation letter I received
that “business is the only group in the community that
unequivocally backs growth”.
So I dug out a CTU publication from the early 1990s.
‘A Quality Future: Working Together for Growth in
New Zealand’, published in October 1992. The report
identified the following commonalities in successful
nations and enterprises:
• an emphasis on co-operation and consensus;
• recognising competition and change as a challenge;
• changing technology;
• quality at all levels;
• less hierarchical management;
• flexibility in the face of a constantly changing world;
• an educated and engaged workforce;
• innovation and creativity at all levels.
It also noted that:
New Zealand needs a clear sense of direction.
A government which sticks to a rigidly ‘hands
off’ approach to economic management cannot
provide the necessary leadership.
In a speech this week, Simon Carlaw welcomed the
Government “transition from unthinking hands-off to
helping hands”. I agree.
Social Partnership Strategies
for Growth
Ross Wilson
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The CTU has also been heartened by the increasing
emergence of a more balanced approach both at the
national policy level from government, and from many
businesses. At the Government level, we have seen a
Treasury paper on the inclusive economy; a document
on social indicators; a focus on economic transformation
through investment, science and innovation; economic
development with industry and regional dimensions;
and greater consideration of the component parts of a
sustainable development strategy. At the level of the
firm, we observe increasing interest in triple bottom line
accounting principles.
We are not naive enough to believe that this means
that costs do not matter. Cost will always matter – all
other things being equal. But as we know, all other things
are not equal. Therefore there needs to be more focus on
revenue generation, new ideas, investment in people,
research and development, and social inclusion.
So – we are interested in an investment and
development approach to economic growth. We are
not keen on jobless growth. We are not happy seeing
some $7 billion a year as our investment income
deficit due partly to repatriation of profits overseas.
Imagine how much lower our current account
deficit would be if the investment deficit was
substantially reduced.
Even if we set aside the uncertain outlook in terms of
a global recession, there are still some major economic
issues to address in this country.
Problems with physical infrastructure, investment
income deficit, low real wages, poverty, income disparity,
and pressures in relation to health and education
expenditure – also high levels of emigration to Australia.
The CTU has for many years advocated a high wage,
high skill policy environment. This would involve interest
and exchange rates that support employment growth,
industry policy that promotes quality exports and import
substitution, a more active role for government, and
significant investment in skill development. Such an
economic policy needs to be underpinned by an adequate
floor of rights in the labour market, and improvements in
the social wage.
But one of the keys to growth from our perspective
is skill development.
Given that over 80% of the workforce of 2010 are
already in the workforce of today, we ignore their skill
development at our economic peril.
We recognise that we must be part of what some now
call the ‘knowledge wave’. This does not mean that we
have to accept the characterisation of the knowledge
society that others might impose. Our concerns about the
Knowledge Wave Conference included criticism of the
tendency to focus on a more élite, highly educated group
with specialist skills, rather than on skill development
at every level. We were also critical of the failure to
address the question of what sort of workplace is
required not only to ensure that lifelong learning is a
reality, but also that knowledge is productively applied
on a day-to-day basis.
I suggest that this will be a workplace characterised
by information sharing, respect for employees, a
teamwork approach to getting the job done, a concern
about quality of life issues – and with good pay
and conditions.
Put simply, workers need to be seen as an investment,
not solely a cost. We are starting to detect a change in
attitude. A training culture is emerging. Many employers
from the late 1980s had been able to source skilled
labour from those displaced through the state sector
restructuring, privatisation process, and the closure of
the so-called protected manufacturing sectors. But that
is no longer possible and there is now an acute awareness
of not only current skill shortages but also the fact that
the age profile of those formally trained has risen.
For the worker of today – job security is not just
about the current job. It is about lifelong learning ensuring
that the combination of relevant skills and experience
ensures employability in a global labour market.
So how do we obtain that buy in to a growth strategy?
How do we, to use Craig Norgate’s words “take
everybody along with us”?
There must be leadership, integrity, process and
commitment.
Leadership
From government, business and from unions. We have
a job convincing union members that there will not be a
re-run of the 1990s sometime in the future. Workers and
their unions did get burnt in the 1990s. They believe the
attack on unions was an attack on their social and
employment conditions.
But we have to move on, and as the largest democratic
organisation in New Zealand with a quarter of a million
affiliated union members, the CTU does have the capacity
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to influence many people in our communities. In fact
communicating at that level is our business.
Whether we can commit ourselves to a particular
growth strategy raises the second principle, integrity.
Integrity
There must be a mutual trust and commitment and a
genuinely inclusive approach. I think we need a social
partnership under which the CTU and Business New
Zealand, and perhaps other organisations, actively
engage with each other and with government to devise
innovative and sustainable solutions.
The successful country models like Ireland, Finland
and Singapore show that the systematic involvement
of the social partners at national, industry and enterprise
level can yield the best results in terms of long-term
economic and social reforms, balancing flexibility
with security, enhancing competitiveness and the
quality of employment, and promoting economic and
social security.
In its most successful forms, social partnership implies
the replacement of an adversarial relationship, and
expands beyond the workplace into broader economic
and social-policy making bodies and labour market
institutions. It promotes a more cooperative relationship
based on mutual trust and respect and the appreciation of
each other’s concerns and objectives.
An ILO study published last year documented the
remarkable economic and labour market recovery made
by four small European countries: Austria, Netherlands,
Denmark and Ireland.
The study shows that social partnership and the
efforts of social partners and governments to arrive at
new solutions played a critical role in their economic and
labour market success.
Process and Commitment
But process is important too. If there is to be a social
partnership approach, we have to put it up there in black
and white. What are we committing to and what are the
expected mutual obligations and returns?
In countries like Ireland the partnership objectives
and commitments are formalised into quite detailed
national agreements which are then debated and
ratified by workers in votes at workplace level.
But there is no ‘best model’ and we would have to
develop our own.
The essential question is whether there is an ability
for either the CTU or Business New Zealand to commit
to such a model with integrity. For our part I would have
to acknowledge that we would have lively debate within
unions if we proposed a social partnership with Business
New Zealand and the government. People are bruised by
the 1990s experience. They have observed a strong
employer attack on the Employment Relations Bill and
now an attack on proposed changes to improve health
and safety at work.
True, Bill English acknowledges that he would not
go back to the ECA but Simon Power has told us that they
would remove the current recognition and role of unions
in the Act. So we are still a target for political attack.
Can we move on to a more mature relationship? We
both have our cowboys. There are pockets of resentment
from the 1990s. For example, there is no doubt that the
current cauldron of dissatisfaction among nurses and
other health workers in Christchurch is directly related
to the actions, and aggressive style, of the health sector
employers down there during the past decade.
I think it is your choice more than it is ours but, like
any partnership, it would require a genuine joint
commitment to make it work. I think we could deliver.
Could you?
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Building Capability
Glenn Withers
The quest for prosperity is a feature of my own country
Australia as well as New Zealand. There are many
similarities between us, in history, location and outlook.
Looking back a century ago, New Zealand and Australia
were tops – the most affluent, democratic and equitable
societies on the planet. Not perfect, just the best.
International capital flowed freely, tariffs and
minimum wages were few and regulation was minimal.
Major technological change was created or imported
and adopted quickly.
In my view, our two colonies were the world’s
cleverest, investing well in ideas, new physical assets,
and in the number and talents of their people. In that
sense they truly were the workingman’s paradise. Our
formula was an open, flexible economy, well equipped
to compete.
But over the years both countries fell prey to creeping
sclerosis, with inward-looking policies of tariffs,
minimum wages, public employment and the full
trappings of the welfare state. The policies grew from
good intentions but were ultimately self-defeating; giving
rise to a culture of dependence focused more on
redistribution than of wealth creation.
The reform process that both our countries went
through in the last two decades has been at times
painful, but has softened the sclerosis to varying degrees.
Australia’s growth resulting from microeconomic
reform has been beneficial; in New Zealand the linkages
between reform and productivity growth and reform
are still being debated.
In my view, more reform is needed. Improvements
could be made in the areas of tax structures, resource
management, and tariffs and trade agreements.
But a different kind of reform is also needed. The
last round of reform created coalitions of losers and
reform fatigue even for the winners. Getting public
buy-in for more reform, no matter how worthwhile,
will be difficult.
A new stage of reform, based on building capability
as well as economic liberalisation, is likely to gain
more public acceptance. Investing in building
capability will allow us to capitalise on change
while reducing the social costs of change.
How do we build capability? With more and better
investment in plant, equipment and infrastructure, and
more and better investment in education and training.
The goal should be more skilled people. A more clearly
targeted safety net and a renewed focus on skilled
immigrants would help.
Population decline threatens this goal in both New
Zealand and Australia. We need at least 1% annual
population growth to sustain our standard of living and
soon neither nation will be achieving this. Population
growth has many spin-off benefits. An expanding
population is essential for maintaining asset values
and providing confidence for new investment.
Population growth increases GDP and productivity –
one study suggests that if the size of an industry is
quadrupled, then the output per worker and per unit of
capital employed is doubled. That increase in output
then creates another benefit – innovation. Research
shows that a 1% increase in total output increases
innovation by 0.6%.
Improved education builds capability. Research
shows skill levels can affect a country’s economic growth.
The Australian post-war experience shows that the
increase in school and tertiary education participation
added some 0.5% to the per capita growth rate.
Investing in maths and science skills in particular can
build capability. A recent international study tested the
influence of maths and science skills on economic growth,
and found a profound impact – on average, a one
standard deviation increase in test scores adds about 1%
to a country’s GDP per capita growth rate. In New
Zealand, some attention to both the top and bottom ends
of its education arrangements could enhance growth
from this source.
These are areas where both the public and private
sectors can contribute to capability building through
education. Building capability requires both public and
private investment. It can appeal to the politics of both
the left and the right. Building capability rejects the great
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trade-off between growth and equity. It says that growth
with liberty, equity and sustainability is feasible; that
fairness, equity and community also sustain growth.
Economic liberalisation combined with capability
building could help us again be best in the world. A
good analogy is with sport – we need exposure to
world competition in order to achieve, but we also
need the infrastructure – facilities and skills – to allow
this to happen.
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Summation: Into Top Gear
Rod Oram
It has been a great pleasure and hugely interesting to
listen to the wealth of speakers and questions through
the day. It is a challenge to try to draw some of the themes
together in these concluding remarks.
Spend or Invest?
To start, I am going to suggest an alternative title to the
day’s conference. Indeed, that is rather bold and
ungracious of me. However, should the debate
be broader? Is it just a question of ‘delivering the
social dividend’ or is it also about ‘investing the
social capital’?
The first is about disbursing, spending the fruits of
the economy. The second is about using New Zealand’s
limited human and financial resources in a way which
enhances the economy, which in turn will generate more
social dividends that we can consume or reinvest.
As the day progressed we heard more about the
latter. It is a good sign that the realisation is dawning here
that New Zealand cannot carry on the way it is going. We
need to change tack, and quite radically so.
The Core Message
Indeed, that was the crystal clear message running
through the day: we need high growth to fund the society
we need and the society we want. Arthur’s excellent
presentation on the health sector was the most chilling
analysis of that. Right now, we simply cannot afford the
healthcare we need and want.
Playing Conditions
As we tackle that tough challenge, we have heard today
that we are dealing with five basic playing conditions:
1. The economy is underperforming. Our long-
term growth rate is around 2% as compared
with the 3% we need to maintain our lowly
position in the OECD, or the 4% we need to
climb back into the top half of the OECD over the
next 20 years, or the 6% if we want to get there
in our lifetime!
2. People want the rewards now (spend rather than
invest) as Arthur Grimes’ analysis showed.
3. Far too few people understand how those rewards
are earned.
4. There is little understanding around the country
about how huge the challenge is and how great the
competition is. Just think of how hard we have to
work our land compared with the South American
country Allan Freeth (chief executive of Wrightson)
mentioned in his panel comments. It has 30 feet of
top soil which has never needed fertilising in 100
years of cultivation. What happens when its dairy
industry gets as big – and better – than ours?
5. But on a far brighter note, I am very grateful to
Glenn Withers (head of Public Policy, Australian
National University) for pointing out how great we
once were. In the late 19th century, the New Zealand
and Australian economies were the most spectacular
achievers in the world. If we did it once, there is a
chance we can do it again.
Health Care
Let me return for a moment to Arthur Grimes’s analysis
of health care. There was a second component to his
presentation which is crucially important. It shows
that our task is not simply to raise GDP per capita
and thus the level of health spending. There is in fact
no correlation between the two. The UK is rapidly
increasing spending these days but without, so
far, making the nation much healthier. So part two
of the task is to find new and better ways to run
health and other services. Yet there cannot be much
enthusiasm left in our health or other sectors for yet
more reform. Once again, we see the challenge is very
big indeed.
Economic Drivers
At one level, economic growth is very simple.
There are only a handful of drivers, only a few levers
to pull. Here are four which were key to Arthur
Grimes’s analysis:
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1. Population: More people, all being well, leads to
more growth. We have 3.8m people today but if we
had had a more accommodating immigration policy,
a more welcoming society and better assimilation
over the post-war years, we could have had 4.5m
people today and growth of 6% a year. So, what
can we do to be more welcoming now?
2. Savings: We are not a nation of savers. We expect
the government to provide pensions, healthcare,
education and the like. So we feel free to spend
what we have (and more!). But a demographic
nightmare is looming as the population ages.
However, this government’s attempt to ease the
problem by diverting money each year into a
long-term superfund will dampen not stimulate
economic growth.
3. Taxation: There is much to learn from other
countries about improving the taxation system. The
recent McLeod Report was full of such ideas, but
this government has made it abundantly clear it will
not even consider most of them. That is a triumph,
if I may suggest, of the government’s political
drivers over the nation’s economic drivers.
4. Enlargement: We have tried to expand our home
market through Closer Economic Co-operation with
Australia. Right now, that is deeply flawed by
considerable inequities and double standards. Yes,
let us push for real CER but the message is that we
should push for one which really works.
5. There’s much to learn from the European Union on
common markets. More important, though, is
globalisation. Through an increasingly open world
economy we are moving towards a virtual economic
union of huge scale. But we need never to forget
what is needed for New Zealand to play a vibrant
role in those wider systems: education, science and
entrepreneurship – in other words, the rewards of
investing social capital.
Growing Companies
If new roads to prosperity are opening up in front of us,
we will need some splendid vehicles to take us on that
journey. In other words, we need more, bigger, better
companies. On that score, Colin Campbell-Hunt
delivered some excellent analysis of the best companies
in the country, those which have gone global but
remained firmly based here.
Here are some of their typical attributes: large shares
(up to 1/3rd) of a niche global market; 90+% of their
revenues are generated offshore; active in dozens of
countries; have global reputations; are faster to market
than their competitors; but they remain based here
rather than spread their R&D and manufacturing
around the world.
Above all, they have achieved – each in their own
business model – a balance and coherence. They are
also bold, as one such company told us today. “We
didn’t realise how abnormal we were. Barriers? I
can’t accept them”, said David Boyd (chief executive,
Foot Science International), in the panel discussion
after Colin’s presentation.
But clearly there are at least three big challenges for
the corporate sector (and for the nation which has a role
in nurturing them):
1. This is very hard work
2. We are an entrepreneurial nation (as shown by the
recent Global Entrepreneurship Monitor of 29
nations: New Zealand comes top in “opportunity
entrepreneurs”. The report is available from
Unitec in Auckland, the researcher for the New
Zealand component of the study). But most of
our entrepreneurs have very limited ambitions
and skills. We need to find ways to enhance
both factors.
3. Here I am adding my own observation. We cannot
prosper by being a nation of entirely small
companies. The arithmetic does not stack up into a
big enough economy, particularly as our definition
of a medium-sized company would still rate as
a very small company in Europe or North
America. So, we also have to find ways to build
some very big companies. Unfortunately to date,
our skill seems to lie in the knack of shrinking
companies: witness Fletcher Challenge, Brierley
Investments and Air New Zealand, to name but three
recent examples.
Here’s one example of how slow we are building
companies. It is a comparison of Genesis Research &
Development, our one and only real biotech company,
and Corixa, is US partner in drug development. Corixa
is already some six times larger than Genesis, yet they
were established in the same year, 1994.
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Science, R&D and Commercialisation
Many factors have held back Genesis, ranging from
New Zealand’s woefully inadequate capital markets
to our inability to push our good science out of the
labs and on up the value chain through R&D to
commercialisation.
We heard today a bit about the efforts being
made to improve than nexus of science and
business substantially, but we have a very long
way to go.
Compliance Costs
We also heard today how burdensome is the cost of
compliance and the tax rate, to the point that they are
retarding growth of companies here in New Zealand. I
appreciate why business people believe that. But some
perspective is helpful:
1. Society is always making tradeoffs. We have some
160 traffic deaths a year in New Zealand, a rate
far higher than the UK but in line with France, for
example. We could lower the rate by spending far
more money on road building, stricter safety
standards for cars, policing and on driver
education. But we as a nation (through the
government) realise our financial resources are
finite. The government tries to allocate them in an
optimal way. So we do not spend as much as we
could on reducing traffic accidents. Similarly we
have a rough notion as a nation how safe we want
workplaces to be. So we have a regulatory process
to try to deliver that. If we accepted a higher rate
of workplace deaths, we could spend less. If we
wanted fewer we could spend more. Which leads
to the next point:
2. There are always better ways of doing things.
We must always be seeking more effective,
more efficient ways of achieving those goals.
3. By international comparisons, New Zealand’s
compliance costs are low.
4. Compliance costs per worker are lower for large
companies than small. Therefore we need to find
ways to grow companies and/or aggregate
compliance demands on, say, a group of small
companies so together they can achieve ‘compliance
critical mass’, achieving the compliance efficiency
of larger companies.
Government’s Role
We have also heard a lot today abut the role of
government. It is important to reflect how much that
role has changed in the last couple of years from very
hands-off to one of facilitation and co-ordination. And
it is not just the role of the political drivers through
a change of government that has changed but also
the bureaucratic drivers in the civil service have
changed too.
Clearly the first has served to redirect the second. But
I think there has also been a hunger in the civil service to
learn new things. They recognise as well as anybody that
no analysis, framework or philosophy can keep serving
well if it remains unchanged in an ever-changing world.
So it was tremendously enlightening to hear about
that change of view and role from Alan Bollard (Treasury
Secretary), Mary Anne Thompson (director, Department
of Prime Minister and Cabinet), Geoff Dangerfield
(chief executive, Ministry of Economic Development)
and Bill Lennox (NZQA).
Four of the themes were:
1. The need to use the social dividend as an enabler
for change, i.e. investing it in people, the need to
rework policies to deliver that, and the need to find
more money for that.
2. Treasury has been doing a lot of work on, for
example, economies of scale. economic geography.
knowledge development and application. These are
all areas which will help us in New Zealand better
understand who, what and where we are as a nation
and how we can work more profitably in the global
economy.
3. The Ministry of Economic Development is a big
change to a facilitative role compared with the old
Ministry of Commerce.
4. NZQA has developed a suite of four strategies to
help ensure: students perform to international
standards, courses meet international standards,
qualifications are completely portable,and the
education sector delivers a sufficient supply of
skilled people.
But above all, the civil servants stressed, there is no
magic bullet. Transformation can only be achieved by
the careful blending of a very wide range of policies
across economic and social fields.
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Economic Performance –
Social Dividend
Though the analysis we have heard today has often been
grim and foreboding, we have also heard enough to gives
us hope: growth, liberty, equity and sustainability are
feasible. We could achieve another golden era for
New Zealand.
Luck has very little to do with that – although it helps.
But luck is so often something you make for yourself by
seeking, creating and exploiting opportunities. It is
impossible to sum up today’s discussion, let alone reduce
the course we need to take to a very simple formula.
However, perhaps this might help keep our minds on
the challenge:
Economic liberalism
+ capability building
+ social inclusion
= the top ranks of the OECD
Are We Getting Our Act Together?
Yes, to some extent.
1. Business New Zealand is developing an integrated
series of policy proposals to address these diverse
issues.
2. The government is learning how to play a more
constructive role
3. The union movement is keen to play its part, but as
Ross Wilson (president, Council of Trade Unions)
pointed out, unions have a very strong sense of deja
vu. What is happening now is exactly what the CTU
were advocating in its document ‘Quality Future’
in 1992.
The view from the coalface was far less encouraging,
though Kim Campbell (chief executive, PSM Healthcare)
delivered a very lively, very blunt message about the
serious inadequacies of the economy and policy to
remedy that. “Our gearbox has no lubrication, no
synchromesh and no overdrive,” he said.
We are spinning our wheels because the social
dividend has already been spent. We are hobbled by a
culture of tribalism, sectional interests and welfarism.
CER is a fiction in politicians’ minds; ACC suffers from
lack of transparency and OSH regulations cost a lot of
time and money.
We will only progress when we ‘get with the game’.
Among other things, we must move on from tribalism to
being members of a nation, from debt to equity finance,
from command and control, from a sports-minded
mentality, to believing in life-time employability (not
life-time employment) and to being entitled to (not
believing in) entitlement.
Kim drove home his point with a quotation from Jack
Welch’s new book, From the Gut, about his 40 years at
General Electric, and in particular his 20 years as CEO
and chairman. To re-quote that now seems like an
appropriate way to try to capture the essence of this day’s
deliberation. What Welch says about companies is very,
very true about countries:
My objective was to put a small-company spirit
in a big-company body, to build an organisation
out of an old-line industrial company that
would be more high-spirited, more adaptable,
and more agile than companies that are one-
fiftieth our size.
I wanted to create a company where
people dare to try new things – where people
feel assured in knowing that only the limits of
their creativity and drive, their own standards
of personal excellence, will be the ceiling on
how far and how fast they move.
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